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ABSTRACT
Most industrial recommender systems rely on the popular collabora-
tive filtering (CF) technique for providing personalized recommen-
dations to its users. However, the very nature of CF is adversarial
to the idea of user privacy, because users need to share their prefer-
ences with others in order to be grouped with like-minded people
and receive accurate recommendations. Prior related work have pro-
posed to preserve user privacy in a CF framework through different
means like (i) random data obfuscation using differential privacy
techniques, (ii) relying on decentralized trusted peer networks, or
(iii) by adopting secured cryptographic strategies. While these ap-
proaches have been successful inasmuch as they concealed user
preference information to some extent from a centralized recom-
mender system, they have also, nevertheless, incurred significant
trade-offs in terms of privacy, scalability, and accuracy. They are
also vulnerable to privacy breaches by malicious actors. In light of
these observations, we propose a novel selective privacy preserving
(SP2) paradigm that allows users to custom define the scope and ex-
tent of their individual privacies, by marking their personal ratings
as either public (which can be shared) or private (which are never
shared and stored only on the user device). Our SP2 framework
works in two steps: (i) First, it builds an initial recommendation
model based on the sum of all public ratings that have been shared
by users and (ii) then, this public model is fine-tuned on each user’s
device based on the user private ratings, thus eventually learning a
more accurate model.
Furthermore, in this work, we introduce three different algo-
rithms for implementing an end-to-end SP2 framework that can
scale effectively from thousands to hundreds of millions of items.
Our user survey shows that an overwhelming fraction of users
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are likely to rate much more items to improve the overall recom-
mendations when they can control what ratings will be publicly
shared with others. In addition, our experiments on two real-world
dataset demonstrate that SP2 can indeed deliver better recommen-
dations than other state-of-the-art methods, while preserving each
individual user’s self-defined privacy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Collaborative filtering (CF) based recommender systems are ubiqui-
tously used across a wide spectrum of online applications ranging
from e-commerce (e.g. Amazon) to recreation (e.g. Spotify, Netflix,
Hulu, etc.) for delivering a personalized user experience [28]. CF
techniques are broadly classified into two types – (i) classic Nearest
Neighbor based algorithms [34] and more recent matrix factoriza-
tion techniques [16], of which the latter has been more widely and
predominantly adopted in industrial applications [8] for building
large-scale recommender models due to its superiority in terms of
accuracy [16] and massive scalability [13, 19, 27, 31, 32, 38]. Regard-
less of the underlying technique, the performance of a CF system is
generally driven by the “homophilous diffusion” [6] process, where
users must share some of their preferences in order to identify oth-
ers with similar tastes and get good recommendations from them.
The performance of CF algorithms often deteriorates without such
adequate information, as often observed in the classic cold start
[36] problem.
This inherent need for a user to share his/her preferences some-
times leads to serious privacy concerns. To make things more com-
plicated, privacy is not a static concept and may greatly vary across
different users, items and places. For example, different users under
changing geopolitical, social and religious influences may have
varying degree of reservation about explicitly sharing their ratings
on sensitive items that deal with subjects like politics, religion,
sexual orientation, alcoholism, substance abuse, adultery, etc. [7].
Overall, these privacy concerns can prevent a user from explicitly
rating many items, which reduces the overall performance of a CF
algorithm, as compared to an ideal scenario, where everyone freely
rates all the items they consume.
1.1 Motivation
In this paper, we explore the idea of letting each user define his/her
own privacy. In other words, here the user decides which ratings
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Figure 1: Working of a selective privacy preserving (SP2)
framework from a user’s perspective.
he/she can comfortably share publicly with others, while his/her
remaining ratings are considered as private, which means that they
are stored only on the user’s device locally and are never shared
with anyone including any peers or a centralized recommender
system. Thus, this scheme enables each user to selectively define
his/her own privacy. Figure 1 shows an example of such an oper-
ational setup. In this paper, we attempt to build a CF framework
that preserves each user’s selective privacy and investigates the
following issues in enabling such a framework:
• How can we build a selective privacy preserving (SP2) CF model
that assimilates information from two kinds of ratings – all users’
public ratings and each user’s on-device private ratings?
• How can we ensure that there is no loss of private information in
our SP2 framework?
• Can the SP2 framework improve the performance of a CF algo-
rithm? In other words, does the SP2 framework improve the overall
recommendation quality at all by taking into account each user’s
private ratings? Or should the users simply hold back from rating
sensitive materials if they have any privacy concern?
•Can this SP2 CFmodel ensure scalability with respect to industrial-
scale datasets?
Interestingly, the selective privacy preserving framework pro-
posed in this paper is somewhat analogous to the rules of a classic
poker game1 (Omaha hold ‘em), where each player tries to form
a best hand combining some of the community cards (which are
publicly visible to everyone) and some of the hole cards (which are
privately dealt to each player).
1.2 Contributions
In the rest of this paper, we address the questions listed in Section
1.1 and make the following contributions:
•We mathematically formulate the selective privacy preservation
problem and present a formal framework to study it (Section 2). To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work under the umbrella
of federated machine learning [15] that supports a private on-device
recommendation model for CF algorithms.
•We propose three different strategies (Section 3) for efficiently
implementing an end-to-end SP2 framework, each of which is con-
ducive to different situations. These underlying techniques overall
ensure that a SP2 CF model incurs only a reasonable cost in terms
of storage and communication overhead, even when dealing with
massive industrial datasets or large machine learning models.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omaha_hold_‘em
Table 1: Definitions of symbols used in (1) - (3)
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition
µ global mean of ratings Ω set of observed ratings
bu bias for user u pu latent vector for user u
bi bias for item i qi latent vector for item i
δ Learning rate λ Regularization parameter
rui actual rating of i by u ˆrui prediction of u’s rating for i
eui calculated as (rui - ˆrui )
• We present analytical results on two real datasets comparing
different privacy preserving and data obfuscation techniques to
show the effectiveness of our SP2 framework (Section 4). We also
empirically study what is a good information sharing strategy for
any user in a SP2 framework and how much are the recommenda-
tions of a user affected, when he/she refrains from rating an item,
instead of marking the latter as private.
•We present the results of a pilot study (Section 5), which demon-
strates that an overwhelming majority of participants are willing
to adopt this technology in order to receive more relevant recom-
mendations without sacrificing their individual privacies.
2 SP2 ARCHITECTURE
Our proposed selective privacy preserving (SP2) framework for CF
algorithms is broadly based on the popular matrix factorization
(MF) method, mainly due to its better performance, scalability and
industrial applicability [8, 13, 16, 27, 32]. However, some of our
discussions can also be extended to the traditional nearest neighbor
based CF algorithms [34]. We next briefly review the MF technique
in Section 2.1.
2.1 Background
In the classic biased MF model [16], we try to learn the latent user
and item factors (assumed to be in the same feature space of di-
mension k) from an incomplete ratings matrix [34]. More formally,
here, the estimated rating for a user u on item i , ˆrui is given by
equation (1). The corresponding symbol definitions are provided
in Table 1. We compute the user and item latent factors by mini-
mizing the regularized squared error over all the known ratings,
as shown in (2). This is done either using classic Alternating Least
Squares method [8, 27, 35] which computes closed form solutions
or via Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) [16], which enjoys strong
convergence guarantees [9, 18] and many desirable properties for
scalability [14, 31]. The variable update equations for SGD are given
by equation (3). For simplicity, we assume from now on that the
user and item factors contain the respective biases i.e. user factor
foru (p′u ) implies the column vector [bu 1 pTu ]T and item factor
for i (q′i ) refers to the column vector [ 1 bi qTi ]T .
ˆrui = µ + bu + bi + qTi pu = µ + q
′T
i p
′
u (1)
min
∑
rui ∈Ω
(rui − ˆrui )2 + λ(b2i + b2u+ ∥ qi ∥22 + ∥ pu ∥22 ) (2)
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bu ← bu + δ (eui − λbu )
bi ← bi + δ (eui − λbi )
pu ← pu + δ (euiqi − λpu )
qi ← qi + δ (euipu − λqi )
(3)
2.2 Problem Formulation
In a SP2 framework, each user u has a set of public ratings, denoted
by Ωupublic and a set of private ratings, denoted by Ω
u
private. However,
since Ωuprivate is known only to u, the set of ratings observed here
by the central recommender system is
⋃
u
Ωupublic. We denote the
latter by the notation Ω′public. Now, our problem can be formulated
as a multi-objective optimization problem, where we attempt to
minimize n regularized L2 loss functions together for n users, as
shown below:
min (f1, f2, ..., fn ), where L2 loss (fv ) for user v is given by,
fv :
[ ∑
rv j ∈Ωvprivate
(rv j − ˆrv j )2
]
+ 1n
∑
rui ∈Ω′public
(rui − ˆrui )2
+ λn (b2i + b2u+ ∥ qi ∥22 + ∥ pu ∥22 )
Note, traditionally multi-objective optimization problems are
solved with classic techniques like linear scalarization (also known
as theweighted summethod [10]). In fact, if we assign equal weights
to each user’s L2 loss function, then linear scalarization [10] can
reduce this problem into a single-objective mathematical optimiza-
tion problem (constructed as the weighted sum of the individual
objective functions), which is similar to the one discussed in Section
2.1. However, due to privacy considerations, all of the data (users’
ratings) cannot be pooled together; this makes classic solutions to
multi-objective optimizations problems inapplicable here. We next
outline a privacy-aware model to solve this problem.
2.3 Model
We posit the following assumptions before summarizing our model.
Assumption 1.The central recommender system is semi-adversarial
in nature i.e. it logs any information requested by a user and can
later utilize it to guess what the user has rated privately.
Assumption 2. The central recommender system is not malicious
in nature i.e. it will not deliberately send incorrect information
to a user to adversely impact his/her recommendations. It has an
incentive to provide high quality recommendations to the users.
Framework. Based on the earlier discussions, we now outline the
working of our SP2 framework:
(1) The central recommender system first builds a public model
based on all the users’ shared public ratings using SGD. We obtain
the public user and item factors when the error converges after a
certain number of epochs.
(2) Each user then downloads his/her corresponding public user
factor from the central recommender system.
(3) Additionally, all users’ also download common auxiliary public
model data on their devices. This data is same for all users, and
hence can be broadcasted by the central recommender system (for
authentication in case the server cannot be trusted).
Public 
Ratings 
Uploaded 
Public
Ratings ≈
User 
Factors
Item FactorsX
Private 
Model
Private
Ratings
Download 1 Public 
User Factor Download 
Auxiliary 
Public Model 
Data
Figure 2: Architecture of a selective privacy preserving (SP2)
framework.
(3) Once the auxiliary public model data and public user factor is
locally available on the device, local updates are performed on the
public user factor using auxiliary model information and the private
ratings, which the user has saved on the device and has not shared
with anyone.
(4) The final private user factor and the private model are stored
on the user’s device and never shared or communicated.
Figure 2 presents the overall architecture. Interestingly, in our
framework users never upload/communicate any private rating,
even in encrypted format, thus guaranteeing privacy preservation.
This is notably different from the general federated machine learn-
ing philosophy [5, 15]. We elaborate the need for this difference in
Section 6.
Auxiliary public model data. It is also important to note that
the central recommender system cannot share many parts of the
public model with all the users. In many systems like Netflix, users
only consent to rate a video on the condition that the central rec-
ommender system displays only the average rating for the video,
instead of the individual ratings from the users’ community. In such
cases, the auxiliary public model data cannot contain ratings from
Ω′public, as the latter scenario also constitutes a user-privacy breach,
since the users may not be comfortable sharing their explicit ratings
information with each other. In the same vein, consider the exam-
ple, where the auxiliary public model data comprises of both public
user factors and item factors. This information alone is sufficient
to identify the corresponding public ratings for other users with
reasonable confidence, thus again breaching user privacy. Further-
more, even anonymizing this information is not enough to prevent
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privacy leaks as demonstrated through de-anonymization attacks
on Netflix dataset [30]. Thus, the auxiliary public model data needs
to be designed carefully so that it not only facilitates in building a
better private model on the user’s device, but also simultaneously
safeguards the SP2 framework from privacy breaches. In light of
this, observe that the auxiliary public model data can comprise of
public item factors alone. Each public item factor is updated over
a set of users based on their public user factors and ratings. Thus,
only the set of final public item factors alone do not constitute a
user-privacy breach.
Private ratings distribution. For analyzing the efficacy of our
SP2 framework, it is also important to consider how users privately
rate an item. We examine two different hypotheses for modeling
this:
• Hypothesis 1 (H1). Users always decide independently which
of his/her ratings are private. Formally, for any two users x and
y, who have rated an item i with ratings rxi and ryi respectively,
P(rxi is private | ryi is private) = P(rxi is private).
• Hypothesis 2 (H2). Users do not decide independently which
of his/her ratings are private. In other words, ratings for some
items are more likely to be marked as private. Formally, using
the same mathematical notations as above, P(rxi is private | ryi
is private) , P(rxi is private).
In Section 4, we further discuss how private ratings are allocated
in our experiments based on these two hypotheses.
3 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present three approaches for implementing our
SP2 framework.
3.1 Naive Approach
In this approach, the auxiliary public model data contains the entire
item factor matrix (i.e. all the latent item vectors and their biases).
Each user’s on-device privatemodel is then built following the steps
shown in algorithm 1. The update equation used in this algorithm
are similar to the ones used in the MF model in Section 2.1.
3.1.1 Top-N recommendation. Once the private model is built
for user u, we can locally predict the rating for any item, as shown
in equation (1), using p∗u ,b∗u , since qi ,bi are known for all the items
as part of the auxiliary public model data. These predictions can be
ranked locally on the user device to provide the top-N recommen-
dations.
3.1.2 Privacy Consideration. It is important to highlight some
privacy considerations behind our naive approach:
• Even though a user only needs the corresponding item factors for
each of the privately rated item to compute the on-device private
model, the user cannot simply fetch only the desired item factors
from the central recommender system in order to ensure privacy.
• Consider an alternative scenario, where a user downloads only
some additional irrelevant item factors to obfuscate the private user
information. This would require downloading significantly fewer
number of item factors, as compared to downloading the entire
item factor matrix. However, this would make top-N computation
infeasible locally. Now, the user needs to send back p∗u ,b∗u to the
server, which would allow the server to guess user’s private ratings.
Algorithm 1 Naive method to build on-device private model
Input: δ ← learning rate , λ ← reg. parameter , epochs ← number
of epochs, Q ← Aux. public model data containing all latent
item vectors (qi ), item biases (bi ) and global ratings mean (µ),
pu ← public user latent vector for u, bu ← public user bias for
u, Ωuprivate ← private ratings by u
Output: p∗u ← private user latent vector for u, b∗u ← private user
bias for u,
1: procedure (δ , λ, epochs,Q,pu ,bu ,Ωuprivate)
2: p∗u ← pu ,b∗u ← bu
3: for e = 0; e < epochs; e + + do
4: for all rui ∈ Ωuprivate do
5: ˆrui = µ + b∗u + bi + qTi p
∗
u
6: eui = rui - ˆrui
7: b∗u ← b∗u + δ (eui − λb∗u )
8: bi ← bi + δ (eui − λbi )
9: p∗u ← p∗u + δ (euiqi − λp∗u )
10: qi ← qi + δ (euip∗u − λqi )
11: end for
12: end for
Similarly, sending a randomly perturbed private user factor back to
the server can obfuscate the private information, but will degrade
the quality of top-N recommendations.
• Consider another alternative strategy, where the actual private
user factor is sent along with multiple (k) fake user factors, thereby
obfuscating the private information andmaking itk-anonymous[26].
However, upload speeds are considerably lower than download
speeds. In addition, the overall computation and communication
costs can also increase by orders of magnitude, as the central servers
need to compute multiple top-N recommendation lists for every
user and then send all of them back.
It is important to note that the item factors matrix is downloaded
only once during model building. In some situation, this does not
involve unreasonable communication or storage overhead from the
user end. For example, the total size (in MB) of all the item factors
(I ) of dimension k is given by k × |I | × 8/220, where each item
factor is assumed to be an array of type double. Assuming k = 100,
the download sizes for all the item factors (in raw uncompressed
format) for real datasets like MovieLens [37] and Netflix [37] are
4MB and 10MB respectively. However, for large industrial datasets
(like Amazon [24]) with close to 1 million items, the raw size of all
item factors (of dimension 100) grows linearly to around 763MB.
3.2 Clustering
We propose this method to ensure scalability of the SP2 framework
as the number of items become large. The intuition behind this
approach is that the public auxiliary model data should consist of
some approximate item factors (Q ′), which is much smaller than
the set of all item factors (Q) i.e. |Q ′ | < |Q |. Now, each user u for a
private rating rui should use the approximate item factor q˜′i , instead
of the actual item factor q′i to compute the private model. This ap-
proximation introduces an error in eui calculation for each private
rating rui and is given by p′∗u (q′i − q˜′i )T , where p′∗u is the private
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user factor for u and q˜′i ∈ Q ′. Now, for each user u, we should min-
imize these approximation errors across all his/her private ratings
i.e. minimize
∑
i ∈Ωuprivate p
′∗
u (q′i − q˜′i )T , or p′∗u
∑
i ∈Ωuprivate (q
′
i − q˜′i )T .
Since, the central recommender system does not know any Ωuprivate
for any user, the former prepares the public auxiliary model data
by minimizing the approximation errors across all item factors i.e.
minimize
∑
i ∈Q (q′i − q˜′i )T . This minimization goal is similar to the
objective function used in clustering [12]. Thus, the central recom-
mender system performs this approximation through clustering,
particularly using K-means clustering with Euclidean distance [2].
The individual cluster mean is treated as the approximate item fac-
tor for all the items in the cluster. In summary, the public auxiliary
model data for this method comprises of (1) K cluster centroids ob-
tained after applying the K-means algorithm on all the item factors,
(2) cluster membership information, which identifies which cluster
an item belongs to and (3) global ratings average. Using this public
auxiliary model data, algorithm 2 computes the on-device private
model for each user.
Algorithm 2 Building on-device private model via clustering
Input: δ ← learning rate , λ ← regularization parameter ,
epochs ← number of epochs, Q ′ ← Aux. public model data
containing all cluster centers having latent vectors (ci ), biases
(bci ) and global ratings mean (µ), ρ ← Cluster membership
function, where item i is mapped to cluster ρ(i), pu ← public
user latent vector foru, bu ← public user bias foru, Ωuprivate ←
private ratings by u
Output: p∗u ← private user latent vector for u, b∗u ← private user
bias for u,
1: procedure (δ , λ, epochs,Q ′,pu ,bu ,Ωuprivate)
2: p∗u ← pu ,b∗u ← bu
3: for each cluster c do
4: Nc = Calculate no. of items in c from ρ
5: end for
6: for e = 0; e < epochs; e + + do
7: for all rui in private_ratinдsu do
8: ˆrui = µ + bu + bcρ(i) + c
T
ρ(i)p
∗
u
9: eui = rui - ˆrui
10: b∗u ← b∗u + δ (eui − λb∗u )
11: bcρ(i) ← bcρ(i) + δ (eui − λbcρ(i))/Nρ(i)
12: p∗u ← p∗u + δ (euicρ(i) − λp∗u )
13: cρ(i) ← cρ(i) + δ (euip∗u − λcρ(i))/Nρ(i)
14: end for
15: end for
Note, the cluster membership information for a set of I items
would require 4 × |I | bytes, assuming each cluster id is an integer
which takes 4 bytes. For K clusters, this membership information
size can be further reduced drastically using K bloom filters [4, 23]
where each bloom filter represents a cluster.
3.2.1 Top-N recommendation. In this method recall that all the
item factors are not available locally on the user device. Therefore,
we pursue a different strategy here: user u requests the public item
factors for top-N ′ recommended items (N ′ > N ) from the central
recommender system. The latter computes this usingu ′s public user
factor (p′u ) and then sends the top N ′ items and their corresponding
public item factors to u. u can re-rank these N ′ items based on
his/her private user factor (p∗u ) and then select the top-N . Note, this
top-N ′ computation by the central servers is not a privacy threat,
as it can be easily calculated without any information about user’s
private ratings. Also, recall our assumption 2 in Section 2.3, which
ensures that incorrect top-N ′ information will not be sent by the
central servers.
3.3 Joint Optimization
Our previous approach was based on hard assignment, where each
item was assigned to only one cluster. However, soft clustering
techniques like non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) [17] con-
siders each point as a weighted sum of different cluster centers.
In this approach, we try to perform soft clustering on all the item
factors simultaneously as the public recommendation model is built.
In other words, the central recommender system jointly learns the
public model and the soft cluster assignments. For this, we revise
the equations (1) and (2) to (4) and (5), where C denotes the cluster
center matrix of dimension k × z (z being the number of clusters),
andwi is a column vector representing the different cluster weights
(non-negative) for item i . This problem can be formulated as a
constrained optimization problem and algorithm 3 shows how the
central recommender system performs this joint optimization. One
key aspect in this algorithm is that the weights are updated (step
14) using projected gradient descent (PGD) [20], in order to ensure
that all cluster weights are non-negative. This facilitates in finding
the top-R cluster assignments for any item by finding the highest R
corresponding weights. Finally, the auxiliary model data for this ap-
proach should consist of the following: (1) the cluster center matrix
C , (2) item biases bi , (3) top-R cluster weights (in descending order)
for each item i , the corresponding cluster ids and (4) the global
ratings mean. Using C and top-R cluster weights for any item i ,
user u can locally approximate the public item factor for any item
by its weighted sum of top-R cluster centers i.e.
∑
n∈top R
wnCn (Cn
represents the nth cluster center). With this approximation, u can
now use algorithm 1 to compute the on-device private model again.
Note, when R is small, we can save a significant communication cost
by sending only top-R weights as compared to the naive approach.
ˆrui = µ + bu + bi +wTi C
Tpu (4)
min
∑
rui ∈Ω′public
(rui − ˆrui )2 + λ(b2i + b2u+ ∥ wi ∥22 + ∥ c ∥22 + ∥ pu ∥22 )
s.t.wi j ≥ 0.
(5)
3.3.1 Top-N recommendation. Interestingly, with the auxiliary
model data for this method, user u can locally compute the approxi-
mation for each item factor, as mentioned above. As a consequence,
u is also able to locally compute the top-N recommendations using
these approximate item factors.
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Algorithm 3 Joint optimization based matrix factorization
Input: δ ← learning rate , λ ← regularization parameter ,
epochs ← number of epochs, Ω′public ← seto f allpublicratinдs
Output: C,pu ,bu ,bi ,wi for all users and items
1: procedure (δ , λ, epochs,Ω′public)
2: µ = Mean(Ω′public)
3: Initialize bu ,pu ,bi ,wi ,C with values from N (0, 0.01).
4: for e = 0; e < epochs; e + + do
5: for all rui in private_ratinдsu do
6: ˆrui = µ + bu + bi +wTi C
Tpu
7: eui = rui - ˆrui
8: bu ← bu + δ (eui − λbu )
9: bi ← bi + δ (eui − λbi )
10: pu ← pu + δ (euicwi − λpu )
11: C ← C + δ (euiwipTu − λc)
12: wi ← wi + δ (euicTpu − λwi )
13: for eachw ∈ wi do
14: w ← Max(w, 0) //PGD
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
4 EXPERIMENTS
We compared the performance of our SP2 framework with various
baselines, as described next, under different settings on two real
datasets, viz., MovieLens-100K [11] data and a subset of Amazon
Electronics [24] data.
4.1 SP2 vs. Different Baselines
• Absolute Optimistic (Everything public): Here, we assume that
every user optimistically shares everything publicly without any
privacy concern i.e. a single MF model is built on the entire training
data itself. Theoretically, this should have the best performance,
thus providing the overall upper bound.
• Absolute Pessimistic (Everything private): Here, we assume that
every user is pessimistic and does not share anything publicly due
to privacy concerns. Thus separate models are built for each user
based only on their individual ratings, which in practice, is as good
as using the average rating for that user for all his/her predictions.
• Only Public: This mimics the standard CF scenario, where privacy
preserving mechanisms are absent. Consequently, the users only
rate the items, which they are comfortable with sharing; they re-
frain from explicitly rating sensitive items. We build a single MF
model using only the public ratings and ignore the private ratings
completely.
• Distributed aggregation: Shokri et al. [33] proposed peer-to-peer
based data obfuscation policies, which obscured the user ratings
information before uploading it to a central server that eventually
built the final recommendation model. The three obfuscation poli-
cies mentioned are: (1) Fixed Random (FR) Selection: A fixed set of
ratings are randomly selected from other peers for obfuscation. (2)
Similarity-based Random (SR) Selection: A peer randomly sends a
fraction of its ratings to the user for obfuscation depending on its
similarity (Pearson, cosine, etc.) with the user. (3) Similarity-based
Minimum Rating (SM) Frequency Selection: This approach is similar
to the previous one, except that instead of randomly selecting the
ratings, higher preference is given to the ratings of those items that
have been rated the least number of times.
• Fully decentralized recommendation: Berkovsky et al. [3] proposed
a fully decentralized peer-to-peer based architecture, where each
user requests rating for an item by exposing a part of his/her ratings
to a few trusted peers. The peers obfuscate their profiles by generat-
ing fake ratings and then compute their profile similarities with the
user. Finally, the user computes the rating prediction for the item
based on the ratings received from the peers and the similarities
between them.
• Differential Privacy: McSherry et al. in [26] masks the ratings
matrix sufficiently by adding random noise, drawn from a normal
distribution, to generate a noisy global average rating for each
movie. These global averages are then used to generate βm ficti-
tious ratings to further obscure the ratings matrix. This method
ensures that the final model obtained does not allow inference of
the presence or absence of any user rating.
For all MF models, the hyper-parameters were initialized with
default values from the Surprise package2.
4.2 Private Ratings Allocation
We first provide the following two definitions, which are used later
for the private ratings allocation:
• User privacy ratio for a user u is defined as the fraction of u ′s total
ratings which are marked private by u.
• Item privacy ratio for an item i is likewise defined as how many of
the total users (which assigned i a rating) have marked i as private.
In order to examine the SP2 framework under two different
hypotheses (stated in Section 2.3), we preprocess the datasets as
discussed below:
• H1.We generate user privacy ratios in the interval [0, 1] for all n
users from a beta distribution [21] with parameters α , β . For each
user u with user privacy ratio γu , (1 − γu ) fraction of u’s ratings
are randomly selected and marked as public, while the remainder
of u’s ratings are considered private.
• H2. Here, we generate item privacy ratios for allm items from a
beta distribution. For each item i with item privacy ratio γi , (1−γi )
fraction of ratings assigned to i are randomly selected and marked
as public, while the remainder of i’s ratings are considered private.
For all our empirical analysis, we considered the following four
beta distributions, as shown in Figure 3.
1. Mostly Balanced (α = 2, β = 2): Most user/item privacy ratios are
likely to be close to the theoretical mean value 0.5.
2. Mostly Extreme (α = 0.5, β = 0.5): Most users/items have either
very high or very low privacy ratios. The overall average of the
privacy ratios will be close to 0.5.
3. Mostly Pessimistic (α = 5, β = 1): Most users/items have very
high privacy ratios.
4. Mostly Optimistic (α = 1, β = 5): Most users/items have very low
privacy ratios.
2http://surprise.readthedocs.io/en/stable/matrix_factorization.html
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Figure 3: Probability density functions of four different beta
distributions used in private ratings allocation.
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Figure 4: Performance comparison among various baselines
for different user privacy ratios on MovieLens dataset.
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Figure 5: Comparing SP2 implementations for different
number of clusters on Amazon Electronics dataset (prepro-
cessed usingmostly balanced beta distribution and H1).
4.3 Results
We evaluate our SP2 framework using accuracy-based as well as
ranking-based metric. The 5-fold average RMSE and NDCG@10
scores [22] along with their corresponding standard deviations are
reported in Table 2 for the MovieLens and Amazon Electronics
datasets.
As indicated by the results in Table 2, the peer-to-peer based
techniques and the differential privacy method, which attempt to
ensure complete user privacy from the central recommender system,
end up performing worse than the standard only public baseline due
to the data obfuscation policies. In addition, the fully decentralized
approach in [3] is not scalable due to the limited number of trusted
peers. In the same vein, the distributed aggregation approaches in
[33] suffer from poor performance as the number of peers increases
due to higher obfuscation; however, lowering the number of peers
risks significant privacy breach by the central recommender system.
Table 2 further summarizes that our joint optimization approach
(with only top-3 cluster weights) performs as good as the naive
approach. Our clustering approach for SP2 framework, performs
worse than naive and joint optimization but is largely better than
the only public baseline across both evaluation metrics. Unless
otherwise mentioned in the table, P-value for all results related to
SP2 framework (computed using two-tailed test with respect to only
public baseline) is less than 0.001. As evident from the table, our
results hold across both the hypotheses. However, the performance
of all the implementations improve as the privacy ratio reduces.
This is further demonstrated through figures 4a and 4b which plot
the RMSE and NDCG values respectively against varying average
user privacy ratio across all users. Finally, figures 5a and 5b present
an ablation study that studies the performance and communication
cost for different SP2 frameworks with varying number of clusters.
The naive method has the best performance but requires the largest
auxiliary model data. The joint optimization technique require an
order of magnitude less data than the naive one but can reach the
same performance for an optimal number of clusters.
5 SURVEY
We conducted a survey3 to gauge public interest in using our SP2
framework. In total, 74 users responded, of which 74% were male
and 24% were female. 92% of our respondents were within the age
bracket (18 − 30). In our survey, we found that 57% of the partici-
pants do not rate items on any platform, whereas around 20% of the
users provide a lot of ratings. About 48% of the respondents claim
they hesitate to rate an item because they do not want to share their
opinion publicly or because they do not trust the platform. The last
two questions in our survey were aimed at estimating how likely a
user is to provide a rating, if he/she can use our selective privacy
preserving framework. When users were asked if they would rate
more items privately on their device, if it guarantees to improve
the quality of their recommendations, about 56% of the users re-
sponded affirmatively, while 22% said ‘maybe’ and 22% responded
with a disagreement. The responses to this survey indicate that an
overwhelming majority of users are willing to use our proposed
selective privacy preserving framework in order to improve their
recommendations as well as safeguard their private information.
6 RELATEDWORK
Privacy preserving recommender systems has been well explored in
the literature. Peer-to-peer (P2P) techniques [3] are largely meant
to protect users from untrusted servers. However, they also require
users to share their private information with peers, which is a pri-
vacy breach in itself. In addition, P2P architectures lack scalability
due to limited number of trusted peers and are vulnerable to mali-
cious interferences by rogue actors. Differential privacy methods
[26] provide theoretical privacy guarantees for all users, but can
3https://goo.gl/yK2FDd
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Table 2: Experimental results on MovieLens and Amazon Electronics datasets
Category Method Model Parameters Movielens Amazon ElectronicsRMSE NDCG@10 RMSE NDCG@10
Peer-to-peer
Based
Shokri et al. (FR) #Peers= 10 1.1624±0.00189 0.4873±0.0055 1.2216±0.01229 0.7757±0.00841
Shokri et al. (SR) #Peers= 10 1.1624±0.00562 0.4891±0.00773 1.2048±0.00889 0.7774±0.00686
Shokri et al. (SM) #Peers= 10 1.1447±0.00629 0.4922±0.0094 1.2028±0.00985 0.7748±0.00887
Berkovsky et al. #Peers= 40 1.132±0.00411 0.4876±0.00599 1.3405±0.00562 0.7619±0.00756
Diff. Privacy McSherry et al. βm = 15 1.201±0.00675 0.4795±0.00911 1.1349±0.00664 0.7719±0.00675
Extreme
Baselines
Abs. Pessimistic k = 100, #epochs = 20 0.9632±0.00489 0.4132±0.00661 0.9788±0.00368 0.7379±0.00535
Abs. Optimistic k = 100, #epochs = 20 0.8923±0.00576 0.5426±0.0072 0.9538±0.00955 0.788±0.00818
Classic
Collaborative
Filtering
Only Public (H1)
α = 2, β = 2, µ = 0.48 0.9183±0.00725 0.545±0.00726 0.971±0.00516 0.7892±0.00334
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, µ = 0.48 0.925±0.0075 0.5468±0.00688 0.9775±0.00455 0.788±0.00204
α = 5, β = 1, µ = 0.82 0.9518±0.00822 0.5363±0.00727 0.9957±0.00763 0.7738±0.00233
α = 1, β = 5, µ = 0.17 0.9033±0.00641 0.5534±0.00179 0.96±0.00411 0.7955±0.00446
Only Public (H2)
α = 2, β = 2, µ = 0.48 0.9206±0.00328 0.5391±0.00179 0.9692±0.00895 0.787±0.00463
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, µ = 0.48 0.9287±0.00228 0.528±0.00596 0.969±0.00931 0.7853±0.00242
α = 5, β = 1, µ = 0.82 0.9522±0.00213 0.517±0.00797 0.9851±0.00808 0.7718±0.00517
α = 1, β = 5, µ = 0.17 0.9063±0.00294 0.5466±0.00212 0.9581±0.00946 0.7929±0.00456
Selective
Privacy
Preserving
(SP2)
Naive (H1)
α = 2, β = 2, µ = 0.48 0.9051±0.00654 0.5558±0.00511 0.9613±0.00534 0.7991±0.00322
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, µ = 0.48 0.9072±0.00873 0.5542±0.00727 0.9641±0.00555 0.7978±0.0012
α = 5, β = 1, µ = 0.82 0.9316±0.0088 0.5444±0.00666 0.9808±0.00733 0.7868±0.00297
α = 1, β = 5, µ = 0.17 0.8953±0.00688 0.5594±0.00696 0.9526±0.00525 0.8048±0.00318
Naive (H2)
α = 2, β = 2, µ = 0.48 0.907±0.00377 0.5514±0.00123 0.9589±0.00921 0.7977±0.00378
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, µ = 0.48 0.914±0.00302 0.5383±0.00491 0.9603±0.00937 0.793±0.00222
α = 5, β = 1, µ = 0.82 0.9316±0.00215 0.5274±0.00802 0.9705±0.00795 0.7824±0.00459
α = 1, β = 5, µ = 0.17 0.8946±0.0032 0.5532±0.00306 0.9517±0.00949 0.8034±0.00411
Clustering (H1)
α = 2, β = 2, µ = 0.48 0.9165±0.00766 0.5457±0.00695 0.966±0.00565 0.7893±0.00353a
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, µ = 0.48 0.9146±0.01183 0.5494±0.00795 0.9695±0.00774 0.7876±0.00309
α = 5, β = 1, µ = 0.82 0.9387±0.00854 0.5366±0.00681 0.9847±0.00741 0.7736±0.00241
α = 1, β = 5, µ = 0.17 0.9037±0.00634 0.5538±0.00206 0.958±0.0048 0.7945±0.00373
Clustering (H2)
α = 2, β = 2, µ = 0.48 0.9183±0.00395 0.5401±0.00172 0.9653±0.00924 0.7871±0.00464b
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, µ = 0.48 0.9249±0.00206 0.5287±0.00598 0.9651±0.00938 0.7852±0.00228
α = 5, β = 1, µ = 0.82 0.9405±0.00166 0.5174±0.00718 0.9757±0.00812 0.7716±0.00528
α = 1, β = 5, µ = 0.17 0.9047±0.00319 0.5473±0.00121 0.9566±0.00971 0.7926±0.00436
Joint Opt. (H1)
α = 2, β = 2, µ = 0.48 0.9051±0.00654 0.556±0.00502 0.9612±0.00533 0.7989±0.00315
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, µ = 0.48 0.9072±0.00873 0.5537±0.00735 0.964±0.00556 0.7975±0.00098
α = 5, β = 1, µ = 0.82 0.9316±0.0088 0.5447±0.00646 0.9808±0.00734 0.7869±0.00338
α = 1, β = 5, µ = 0.17 0.8953±0.00689 0.5592±0.00706 0.9526±0.00524 0.8045±0.00318
Joint Opt. (H2)
α = 2, β = 2, µ = 0.48 0.907±0.00377 0.551±0.00095 0.9589±0.0092 0.7978±0.00371
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, µ = 0.48 0.914±0.00302 0.5383±0.00507 0.9602±0.00939 0.793±0.0022
α = 5, β = 1, µ = 0.82 0.9319±0.00241 0.5278±0.00851 0.9705±0.00792 0.782±0.00479
α = 1, β = 5, µ = 0.17 0.8947±0.0032 0.5533±0.00289 0.9517±0.0095 0.8034±0.00423
aPvalue < 0.02
bPvalue < 0.1, statistically insignificant
also adversely impact the performance of the recommender systems
due to data obfuscation.
The related literature also comprises of cryptology [39] based
techniques that approach the problem little differently. For exam-
ple, Zhan et al.[39] used “homomorphic encryption” to integrate
multiple sources of encrypted user ratings in a privacy preserving
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manner. However, the extreme computation time and scalability
issues associated with homomorphic encryption pose a serious
practicality question [29], even for moderate size datasets.
Lastly, recent federated machine learning approaches [15] have
proposed privacy-preserving techniques to build machine learning
models using secure aggregation protocol [5]. However, in case
of CF algorithms, this would require a user to share an update
(in encrypted form) performed on an item factor locally. In our
case, this means that the server would be able to identify from the
encrypted updates, which items the user had rated privately, even
though the exact ratings remain unknown. This itself constitutes a
serious privacy breach [1, 7, 25]. Hence, in our SP2 framework, no
private user information is ever uploaded or communicated.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel selective privacy preserving (SP2)
paradigm for CF based recommender systems that allows users to
keep a portion of their ratings private, meanwhile delivering better
recommendations, as compared to other privacy preserving tech-
niques. We have demonstrated the efficacy of our approach under
different configurations by comparing it against other baselines on
two real datasets. Finally, our framework empowers users to define
their own privacy policy by determining which ratings should be
private and which ones should be public.
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